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“ARMED AND DANGEROUS” A HALF CENTURY 
LATER:  TODAY’S GUN RIGHTS SHOULD 
IMPACT TERRY ’S FRAMEWORK 
Alexander Butwin* 
 
Over fifty years ago, in Terry v. Ohio, the U.S. Supreme Court established 
a two-part framework in which police officers may, without a warrant, stop 
and search an individual for weapons without violating the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.  
Officers must (1) suspect that criminal activity has occurred, or will soon 
occur, and (2) have a reasonable fear that the individual is “armed” and 
poses a threat to the responding officers or to others—i.e., “dangerous.”  The 
second prong’s exact meaning is disputed and has created a split among the 
circuits as to whether merely being “armed” inherently makes a gun carrier 
“dangerous” and thereby justifies a search. 
This Note examines how various courts have approached the issue, 
analyzes the split among these approaches, and ultimately argues that, in 
light of the significant developments in gun rights, state gun laws should 
dictate Terry’s interpretation.  Because gun rights are considerably more 
expansive today than they were back in 1968, an individual carrying a 
firearm, without more, should be insufficient to justify a search under the 




I.  THE CONSTITUTION, STATE GUN LAWS, AND THE POLICE’S 
AUTHORITY TO FRISK .......................................................... 1036 
A.  The Second Amendment’s “Right to Bear Arms” Has  
Been Given Meaning..................................................... 1036 
B.  The History and Purpose of the Fourth Amendment ...... 1039 
C.  Balancing the Fourth Amendment with Public Safety:   
Terry v. Ohio ................................................................ 1041 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2020, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2016, Columbia 
University.  I would like to thank Professor Nicholas Johnson for his guidance, the Fordham 
Law Review editors and staff for their diligence, and my family and friends for their 
encouragement, love, and support. 
 
1034 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT:  ARMED AND (THEREFORE)  
DANGEROUS? ....................................................................... 1043 
A.  The Difficulty in Rendering a Robinson Decision .......... 1043 
1.  Robinson I ................................................................ 1043 
2.  Robinson II ............................................................... 1044 
3.  Robinson III ............................................................. 1045 
4.  Robinson IV .............................................................. 1046 
B.  Does “Armed” Mean “Dangerous”? ............................. 1047 
1.  “Armed” Equals “Dangerous” Under Terry ............ 1047 
2.  “Armed” Does Not Equal “Dangerous” Under 
Terry ........................................................................ 1050 
III.  MERELY BEING “ARMED” SHOULD NOT MAKE ONE  
INHERENTLY “DANGEROUS” IN PUBLIC CARRY STATES ..... 1053 
A.  1968 to Today:  Expanding Gun Rights ......................... 1054 
B.  The Threat a Gun Carrier Could Potentially Pose Is  
Not a Significantly Greater Public Policy  




Shaquille Robinson, a black male, entered his female friend’s Toyota 
Camry in the 7-Eleven parking lot on North Mildred Street—a notorious 
high-crime area in Ranson, West Virginia.1  An anonymous tip alerted police 
that a black male, in a blue-green Toyota Camry with a white female, was 
carrying a loaded gun.2  The officers pursued the vehicle, and upon finding 
it, noticed that neither the driver nor the passenger was wearing a seatbelt.3  
The officers pulled the car over for the traffic violation, and instead of asking 
for identification, the officer who approached the passenger-side door 
ordered Robinson out of the car.4  Because of the tip received, the officer 
figured that asking Robinson to reach into his pocket would have been a bad 
idea.5  The officer then asked Robinson if he was carrying a firearm, to which 
Robinson did not verbally respond.6  Instead, he gave the officer a “weird 
look” that the officer interpreted to mean “I don’t want to lie to you, but I’m 
not going to tell you anything [either].”7 
 
 1. United States v. Robinson (Robinson IV), 846 F.3d 694, 696 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. 
denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (Oct. 30, 2017) (No. 16-1532) (mem.). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. at 697. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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Because of this “weird look,” the officer ordered Robinson to put his hands 
on top of the car.8  He then frisked Robinson and found a firearm.9  After 
learning that Robinson illegally possessed the firearm, the officer arrested 
him.10  Robinson filed a motion to suppress the charges against him, 
contesting the legality of the officers’ search—he alleged specifically that the 
firearm was only discovered after his Fourth Amendment rights had been 
violated.11 
Robinson challenged the officer’s frisk in United States v. Robinson.12  
This case has a unique procedural history, consisting of four judgments, with 
each reversing the preceding one.13  They are each addressed in more detail 
in Part II to illustrate the difficulty courts face with regards to the “armed and 
dangerous” standard14 from Terry v. Ohio,15 which currently serves as the 
guiding authority in Fourth Amendment investigatory stop cases.16 
This Note explores the circuit split concerning the “armed and dangerous” 
standard from Terry that permits police officers to frisk for weapons while 
conducting a temporary investigatory stop.17  More specifically, this Note 
addresses whether “armed” should be synonymous with “dangerous” in 
states that permit their citizens to publicly carry firearms, or whether treating 
the standard’s two terms synonymously constricts one’s Fourth Amendment 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures18 merely because 
one’s Second Amendment and state-given rights to publicly carry firearms 
were exercised.19 
Part I of this Note provides background on the relevant constitutional, 
state, and case law.  Part I.A discusses the Second Amendment and current 
state law regarding publicly carrying firearms.  Part I.B introduces the Fourth 
Amendment.  And Part I.C explains Terry’s “armed and dangerous” standard 
for frisks, which courts have inconsistently interpreted and applied. 
Part II addresses the competing interests underlying this circuit split.  Part 
II.A revisits Robinson—a difficult Fourth Circuit case that highlights the 
issue.  Through its procedural history, Robinson presents both positions of 
the split.  Part II.B then discusses both sides of the aforementioned split with 
regards to whether “armed” inherently means “dangerous” for Terry frisk 
purposes. 
 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (Oct. 30, 2017) (No. 16-
1532) (mem.). 
 13. See infra Part II.A. 
 14. See infra Part I.C. 
 15. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 16. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 485 (10th Cir. 2013) (explaining 
that Terry’s framework outlines the protocol to legally conduct a search and seizure during an 
investigatory stop). 
 17. See infra Part I.C. 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 19. See infra Part I.A. 
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Part III argues that merely possessing a firearm should not inherently make 
a person dangerous for Terry purposes in states that permit their citizens to 
publicly carry firearms.  Part III.A explains that gun laws have drastically 
changed since the Terry opinion was issued and that the standard—
permitting a police officer to conduct a search that is seemingly outside the 
Fourth Amendment’s parameters—should consider the legality of carrying a 
gun.  Finally, Part III.B maintains that equating “armed” with “dangerous” 
for Terry purposes violates a gun carrier’s constitutional rights.  This Part 
also argues that a gun carrier’s potential threat to officer safety, while 
important, does not warrant compromising the integrity of constitutional 
rights and categorically labeling every gun carrier as “dangerous” regardless 
of the legality of their gun possession. 
I.  THE CONSTITUTION, STATE GUN LAWS, AND THE POLICE’S AUTHORITY 
TO FRISK 
To understand how a “weird look” can justify a police frisk, it is important 
to understand both the legal framework governing police conduct during 
investigatory stops and the constitutional guarantees that police frisks of gun-
carrying individuals implicate.  Part I.A surveys the history, meaning, and 
purpose of the Second Amendment, as well as the current gun laws that allow 
Americans to carry firearms in public in certain states.  Part I.B summarizes 
the history and purpose of the Fourth Amendment and its search and seizure 
protection.  Part I.C introduces Terry and its two-part framework that permits 
a police officer to conduct a frisk. 
A.  The Second Amendment’s “Right to Bear Arms” Has Been Given 
Meaning 
The Second Amendment provides:  “A well regulated Militia, being 
necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and 
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”20  This Amendment’s meaning, purpose, 
importance, and utility have been polarizing topics among scholars, political 
pundits, and ordinary citizens.21  Both sides of the debate have turned to the 
 
 20. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 21. Compare David Harsanyi, The Second Amendment Has Always Been an Individual 
Right,  FEDERALIST (Nov. 29, 2018), https://thefederalist.com/2018/11/29/second-
amendment-always-individual-right/  [ https://perma.cc/YS2K-K4U3]  (arguing that the 
Second Amendment stands for an individual right to bear arms), and David Harsanyi, You 
Can Try to Repeal the Second Amendment, but You Can’t Repeal History, NAT’L REV. (Mar. 
30, 2018), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/03/second-amendment-individual-gun-
rights-strong-history/ (same), with Dennis Barron, Opinion, Antonin Scalia Was Wrong About 
the Meaning of “Bear Arms,” WASH. POST (May 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/antonin-scalia-was-wrong-about-the-meaning-of-bear-arms/2018/05/21/9243ac66-
5d11-11e8-b2b8-08a538d9dbd6_story.html [https://perma.cc/H49C-N3L2] (arguing that 
Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 
(2008)—the seminal case that interprets the Second Amendment’s right to bear arms—
misinterpreted the meaning of the Second Amendment), and John Paul Stevens, Opinion, John 
Paul Stevens:  Repeal the Second Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/opinion/john-paul-stevens-repeal-second-
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framers’ intention when drafting the Amendment and to the text itself.  The 
debate centers on whether the Amendment permits individuals to own and 
carry firearms for personal use and defense or whether the Amendment 
protects a collective right that may only be exercised through formal militia 
units.22 
Writers and scholars have tried to decode the framers’ original intention.23  
The framers knew that their government could one day have the authority to 
control its citizens’ access to firearms—something the British had attempted 
to do previously.24  Thus, fearing the consequences and their inability to fight 
back to restore their freedoms, the framers included the Second Amendment 
to safeguard against a tyrannical, oppressive government.25  Alexander 
Hamilton, writing in The Federalist Papers, acknowledged that a well-
regulated militia could be “the most natural defense of a free country.”26  In 
“John DeWitt V,”27 anti-Federalists (who opposed Hamilton and the 
Federalists) also acknowledged, “a well regulated militia, composed of the 
yeomanry of the country, have ever been considered as the bulwark of a free 
people.”28  Having a well-regulated militia that could be ready at a moment’s 
notice prevented the need for a standing army, as both Federalists and anti-
Federalists believed a standing army to be an existential threat to the ideas of 
the revolution.29 
While the Second Amendment debate continues to be a hot topic in 
American politics, two U.S. Supreme Court decisions, District of Columbia 
 
amendment.html [https://perma.cc/34PS-6PX9] (explaining that Justice John Paul Stevens 
strongly disagreed with Heller and believed that the Second Amendment should be repealed). 
 22. See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (interpreting the 
Second Amendment to bestow an individual right—rather than a collective right—to bear 
arms); see also supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 23. See, e.g., TJ Martinell, 2nd Amendment:  Original Meaning and Purpose, TENTH 
AMEND. CTR. (Sept. 22, 2014), https://tenthamendmentcenter.com/2014/09/22/2nd-
amendment-original-meaning-and-purpose/ [https://perma.cc/J8JH-HMHA]; Second 
Amendment, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/united-states-constitution/2nd-
amendment [https://perma.cc/V7EG-AWYU] (last updated June 7, 2019); Noah Shusterman, 
What the Second Amendment Really Meant to the Founders, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/02/22/what-the-second-
amendment-really-meant-to-the-founders/ [https://perma.cc/89RJ-X3MW]. 
 24. Martinell, supra note 23. 
 25. Id. 
 26. THE FEDERALIST NO. 29 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 27. John DeWitt was the author’s pseudonym for several key anti-Federalist papers. 
 28. Essay of John DeWitt V, AM. HERALD, Dec. 1787, reprinted in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST:  MASSACHUSETTS AND NEW ENGLAND 34, 37 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).  On 
the issue, Federalists and anti-Federalists simply disagreed over who should have control over 
militias:  the central government or the states. See Robert Longley, Who Were the Anti-
Federalists?, THOUGHTCO (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.thoughtco.com/anti-federalists-
4129289 [https://perma.cc/Q9VM-6U9R]. 
 29. Shusterman, supra note 23.  While the positions of Federalists and anti-Federalists on 
each issue regarding our nation’s founding are not important to provide context for this issue, 
it is significant that Federalists and anti-Federalists disagreed on most issues but appear to 
have agreed on a militia’s importance. 
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v. Heller30 and McDonald v. City of Chicago,31 currently control the 
Amendment’s legal status.32  Until Heller, courts relied on United States v. 
Miller,33 which was thought to suggest that “the Second Amendment protects 
only a collective or militia-based right to possess firearms.”34 
In Heller, a five-justice majority held that the Second Amendment confers 
an individual right to keep and bear arms and declared that any statute 
banning handguns in the home or prohibiting their lawful use violates the 
Second Amendment.35  The Heller Court found that the Second Amendment 
permits having and carrying a firearm unconnected to the militia36 and, in 
fact, extends “to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that 
were not in existence at the time of the founding.”37 
Throughout the detailed opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the 
majority, examined founding-era legal scholars’ interpretation of the 
Amendment, nineteenth-century case law, and state constitutions to reach the 
conclusion that the Amendment confers an individual right to bear arms in 
self-defense inside one’s home, unconnected to militia service.38 
McDonald followed Heller and held that the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporates the Second Amendment (as recently interpreted by Heller) 
against the states, meaning that the right to bear arms applies to state and 
local governments, in addition to the federal government.39 
Currently, there are only a handful of states that completely forbid their 
people from openly carrying firearms,40 as the “right to openly carry a 
handgun is considered a protected right under” many state constitutions.41  In 
 
 30. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 31. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). 
 32. See generally McDonald, 561 U.S. 742; Heller, 554 U.S. 570. 
 33. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
 34. Clark Neily, District of Columbia v. Heller:  The Second Amendment Is Back, Baby, 
2007 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 127, 129. 
 35. Heller, 554 U.S. at 595, 635. 
 36. Id. at 610, 612. 
 37. Id. at 582. 
 38. See generally id. at 570.  To reject the argument that arms are only permissible in a 
militia context, Justice Scalia adopted Miller’s definition of “militia”—that is, “the Militia 
comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense.” Id. at 
595 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 179).  Justice Scalia supported this definition’s legitimacy by 
proclaiming that it comported with founding-era sources, including Federalist No. 46, 
Webster’s Dictionary from 1828, and an 1811 letter written by Thomas Jefferson. Id. at 595.  
While Miller is thought to have adopted a collective rights theory of the Amendment, Heller’s 
holding reinterprets Miller and adopts an individual right to possess firearms. Id. at 622–23. 
 39. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010).  Through this incorporation, 
states have passed their own laws to expand those rights, allowing firearms to be carried in 
public, rather than just inside the home. See Robinson IV, 846 F.3d 694, 708 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(Harris, J., dissenting) (“[S]tate law has followed [Heller and McDonald], providing expanded 
rights to carry guns in public.”). 
 40. See NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON ET AL., FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT:  
REGULATIONS, RIGHTS, AND POLICY 734–35 (Rachel E. Barkow et al. eds., 2d ed. 2018).  Open 
carry of firearms refers to visibly carrying and exposing a firearm on a belt holster. See Justine 
E. Johnson-Makuch, Note, Statutory Restrictions on Concealed Carry:  A Five-Circuit Shoot-
Out, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2757, 2767 (2015). 
 41. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 40, at 736. 
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fact, all but six state constitutions contain a provision similar to that of the 
Second Amendment.42  About half of states do not require a permit to legally 
carry a firearm, whereas approximately sixteen states require state-issued 
permits to openly carry a firearm in public.43 
Besides open carry regulations, there are also concealed carry laws, which 
enable a gun owner to stow a firearm in a holster that is typically hidden from 
view under clothing.44  Concealed carry laws are made up of three categories:  
unrestricted (sometimes called “constitutional carry”), “shall issue,” and 
“may issue.”45  These three categories vary in the number of requirements or 
steps one must take in order to obtain a license, with “unrestricted” being the 
easiest way to obtain a license and “may issue” being the most difficult.46  
Currently, there are only eight “may issue” states, but this category is slowly 
disappearing as courts have started to rule against “may issue” policies.47 
America’s “open carry” gun laws that permit citizens to carry guns in 
public contribute to the discord among the circuits when determining the 
dangerousness of a gun carrier for Terry purposes.48  Regardless of one’s 
personal opinion on the Second Amendment,49 Heller and McDonald have 
upheld the right to carry and led states to enact their own gun-carry laws.  
Therefore, these cases and laws must be followed until overruled or amended. 
B.  The History and Purpose of the Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment protects “the right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”50  Aggressive British search and seizure practices, including the 
 
 42. Id. at 737.  For example, South Dakota’s constitution declares that “[t]he right of the 
citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and the state shall not be denied.” S.D. CONST. 
art. VI, § 24.  West Virginia’s constitution states that “[a] person has the right to keep and bear 
arms for the defense of self, family, home and state, and for lawful hunting and recreational 
use.” W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 22.  And Ohio’s constitution maintains that “[t]he people have 
the right to bear arms for their defense and security; but standing armies, in time of peace, are 
dangerous to liberty, and shall not be kept up; and the military shall be in strict subordination 
to the civil power.” OHIO CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 43. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 40, at 735; Which States Allow Open Carry?, ALIEN 
GEAR HOLSTERS (Apr. 3, 2019), http://aliengearholsters.com/blog/open-carry-states/ 
[https://perma.cc/H7C3-TMM8]. 
 44. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 40, at 735.  Concealed carry is by far the most common 
method of handgun carrying today. Id. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. See Chris W. Cox, Victory in D.C.!:  Shall-Issue Concealed Carry Coming to the 
Nation’s Capital, NRA-ILA (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.nraila.org/articles/ 
20171120/victory-in-dc-shall-issue-concealed-carry-coming-to-the-nation-s-capital 
[https://perma.cc/DE52-BMUX]; see also Grace v. District of Columbia, 187 F. Supp. 3d 124, 
129, 152 (D.D.C. 2016) (holding that the District of Columbia’s “good reason requirement,” 
which requires concealed carry license applicants to “demonstrate a ‘good reason to fear injury 
to his or her person or property’ or ‘any other proper reason for carrying a pistol’” likely places 
an unconstitutional burden on the Second Amendment “right to carry firearms for self-defense 
both in and outside the home”). 
 48. See infra Part II. 
 49. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 50. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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use of general warrants,51 in England and the American colonies are viewed 
as the “catalysts” for the Fourth Amendment’s adoption.52  A general warrant 
is “unparticularized as to the place or things to be searched for or . . . lack[s] 
specific factual grounds justifying the search.”53  It therefore gives law 
enforcement officers freedom to “[rummage] in a person’s belongings” and 
discover evidence of wrongdoing without specifying the exact things or 
places to be searched.54  These British general warrant practices led states to 
adopt search and seizure provisions in their local constitutions soon after 
declaring independence.55  In fact, after the U.S. Constitution was drafted in 
1779 (without the Bill of Rights), some “states requested that the new 
Constitution be amended to provide protection against unjustified searches 
and seizures.”56  This was the basis and background for what is now the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Today’s Fourth Amendment includes a “warrant requirement.”57  This 
requirement dictates that searches are generally considered reasonable if (1) 
a “neutral and detached magistrate”58 issues a search warrant supported by 
 
 51. See Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817–18 (holding that the secretary 
of state’s general warrant to arrest Entick and seize his books and papers for authoring 
seditious papers constituted a trespass and that the secretary had no right to seize or inspect 
Entick’s property); Wilkes v. Wood (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 489 (declaring that the Crown’s 
general warrant permitting messengers to break in and search people’s homes and places of 
work, as well as seize papers and property without evidence that a crime had been committed, 
was a violation of English common law). 
 52. Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent:  John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 980 (2011). 
 53. Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth?:  The Framers Preserved Common-
Law Criminal Arrest and Search Rules in “Due Process of Law”—“Fourth Amendment 
Reasonableness” Is Only a Modern, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 51, 55 
(2010). 
 54. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). 
 55. See Clancy, supra note 52, at 981.  For example, Connecticut’s constitution currently 
states: 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from 
unreasonable searches or seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to seize 
any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor 
without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation. 
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 7.  And Massachusetts’s constitution currently states: 
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable searches, and seizures, 
of his person, his houses, his papers, and all his possessions.  All warrants, therefore, 
are contrary to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously 
supported by oath or affirmation; and if the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to 
make search in suspected places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to 
seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons 
or objects of search, arrest, or seizure and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, 
and with the formalities prescribed by the laws. 
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XIV. 
 56. Clancy, supra note 52, at 981. 
 57. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978). 
 58. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (“The point of the Fourth 
Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law 
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence.  
Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached 
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probable cause and (2) the warrant particularly describes the persons or 
places to be searched or seized.59  Probable cause exists when the facts and 
circumstances within the officer’s knowledge provide a reasonably 
trustworthy basis for a person of reasonable caution to believe that a criminal 
offense has been committed or is about to take place.60  The warrant 
requirement, however, is often inapplicable to searches for weapons after an 
investigatory stop or arrest.61  Terry outlines the steps police officers must 
take to avoid violating the Fourth Amendment.62  However, as this Note 
highlights, not all circuits agree as it relates to Terry’s standard—that is, 
when firearms are (thought to be) present during investigatory stops.63 
C.  Balancing the Fourth Amendment with Public Safety:  Terry v. Ohio 
As discussed, the Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable 
searches and seizures—not all searches and seizures.64  In the Fourth 
Amendment context of stops and frisks, Terry reigns supreme.65 
In Terry, two men standing on a street corner caught Officer McFadden’s 
attention.66  McFadden could not articulate what it was that drew him to the 
men but while on patrol for shoplifters and pickpockets, he grew 
suspicious.67  McFadden watched one of the men leave the street corner, walk 
past a store, pause, look through the store window, walk a little further, and 
then turn back, look again through the store window, and finally return back 
to the original street corner.68  Upon returning to the corner, he conferred 
with the other man, and then the other man went through the exact same 
motions, looking through the same store window and returning to confer.69  
The two men alternately repeated this ritual about six times each.70  A third 
 
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise 
of ferreting out crime.”). 
 59. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.”). 
 60. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925). 
 61. See generally Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (demonstrating that the officer did not 
need a warrant to frisk the defendant for the investigatory stop).  There are six main exceptions 
to the warrant requirement: searches incident to lawful arrest, the plain view exception, 
consent, stops and frisks, the automobile exception, and emergencies and hot pursuits. 
Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement, LAWSHELF EDUC. MEDIA, https://lawshelf.com/ 
courseware/entry/exceptions-to-the-warrant-requirement [https://perma.cc/T72M-MTSD] 
(last visited Nov. 12, 2019).  This Note only focuses on frisks for weapons during investigatory 
stops. 
 62. See infra Part I.C. 
 63. See infra Part II. 
 64. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960) (“It must always be remembered 
that what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches 
and seizures.”). 
 65. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 66. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5 (1968). 
 67. Id. at 5–6. 
 68. Id. at 6. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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man at one point joined them on the street corner to chat but then walked 
away.71  After about ten-to-twelve minutes, the two men walked away in the 
same path taken earlier by the third man.72  McFadden suspected that the men 
planned to shoplift and considered it his duty as an officer to investigate.73  
Fearing they had a gun, McFadden approached the men, identified himself 
as a police officer, and asked for their names.74  The men mumbled in 
response to the officer’s inquiries, and McFadden then grabbed the petitioner 
and patted the outside of his clothing.75  McFadden felt a gun and removed 
the petitioner’s overcoat to extract the firearm.76  He also frisked the two 
other men and found a firearm on one of them.77 
After being charged with carrying a concealed weapon, the petitioner 
challenged the legality of the officer’s pat-down as a Fourth Amendment 
violation.78  The Court, en route to affirming the petitioner’s conviction, 
discussed the framework that courts would consult going forward.79  
According to Terry, 
where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him 
reasonably to conclude . . . that criminal activity may be afoot and that the 
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently 
dangerous, . . . he is entitled . . . to conduct a carefully limited search of the 
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which 
might be used to assault him.80 
This holding consists of two inquiries:  (1) whether the officer has 
observed unusual conduct which leads him to conclude that criminal activity 
is afoot and (2) whether the officer believes the suspect is armed and 
dangerous.81  Therefore, unless these two inquiries are both answered in the 
affirmative, the Fourth Amendment precludes an officer from conducting a 
frisk.82 
This analysis is an objective one; the Court framed it as “whether a 
reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the 
belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.”83  “[D]ue weight must 
be given, not to [the officer’s] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 6–7. 
 75. Id. at 7. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 30. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Matthew J. Wilkins, Note, Armed and Not Dangerous?:  A Mistaken Treatment of 
Firearms in Terry Analyses, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1166–67 (2017). 
 82. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. 
 83. Id. at 27. 
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‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw 
from the facts in light of his experience.”84 
This Note focuses on the second Terry inquiry.  Assuming an officer has 
observed unusual conduct and reasonably concluded that criminal activity 
might be afoot (thereby permitting him to proceed to the second prong), the 
dispute among the circuits is whether one must be both “armed” and 
“dangerous”—two separate requirements—or whether “armed and 
dangerous” is a unitary concept, implying that one is dangerous because he 
possesses a gun.85  Because Terry was decided back in 1968, interpreting its 
framework today—in light of recent gun law developments enshrining the 
individual right to bear arms (i.e., Heller and McDonald ) and instituting state 
“open carry” laws enabling public firearm possession—has proven 
problematic. 
II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT:  ARMED AND (THEREFORE) DANGEROUS? 
This Part discusses how courts have wrestled with the aforementioned 
problems surrounding the second Terry prong and the resulting circuit split.  
Part II.A revisits Robinson to demonstrate the difficulty in determining 
whether “armed and dangerous” should be a unitary concept or not.  Part II.B 
presents the circuits involved in the split and explains each side’s reasons for 
their positions. 
A.  The Difficulty in Rendering a Robinson Decision 
To illustrate courts’ difficulty in applying Terry’s framework in 
investigatory stop cases, this Part outlines Robinson’s procedural history and 
details each court’s analysis and holding in turn.  As previously discussed, 
each succeeding court overruled the previous one, with Robinson ultimately 
being convicted for illegally possessing a firearm—the fruit of the officer’s 
lawful search.86 
1.  Robinson I 
After a thorough analysis of the case’s relevant facts87 and Terry’s 
framework,88 Magistrate Judge Robert Trumble in United States v. 
Robinson89 (Robinson I ), recommended that Robinson’s motion to suppress 
be granted.90  In his report and recommendation (“R & R”), Magistrate Judge 
 
 84. Id.; see also United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 683–84 (7th Cir. 2013) (“To 
find that reasonable suspicion existed” so as to justify a stop, “the Court must examine the 
totality of the circumstances in the situation at hand.”). 
 85. See infra Part II. 
 86. See Robinson IV, 846 F.3d 694, 701–02 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 
(Oct. 30, 2017) (No. 16-1532) (mem.). 
 87. See supra text accompanying notes 1–11. 
 88. See supra Part I.C. 
 89. No. 3:14-CR-28, 2014 WL 4064038, at *1 (N.D.W. Va. Aug. 8, 2014), report and 
recommendation adopted in part and rejected in part, No. 3:14-CR-28, 2014 WL 4064035 
(N.D.W. Va. Aug. 14, 2014). 
 90. Robinson I, 2014 WL 4064038, at *14. 
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Trumble reasoned that accepting the government’s position—that the 
anonymous tip, location within a high-crime area, and “weird look” were 
sufficient to prove that Robinson was “dangerous” and justify a frisk—would 
lead “every person legally carrying a gun” to “be at risk for invasion of their 
privacy” merely because the notion that they are “dangerous” would always 
follow if there is suspicion that they are “armed.”91  Judge Trumble thereby 
rejected the proposition that being “armed” automatically makes one 
“dangerous.”92  As such, something more than suspicion of a firearm would 
be needed for a police officer to legally conduct a frisk.93 
2.  Robinson II 
In United States v. Robinson94 (Robinson II ), the District Court considered 
Robinson I ’s R & R.  The prosecution objected to the magistrate judge’s 
R & R, and so, District Judge Gina Groh reevaluated the case.95  The district 
court “review[ed] those portions of the R & R to which the United States 
object[ed] de novo and the remainder of the R & R for clear error.”96 
The district court disagreed with Robinson I, holding that when looking at 
the totality of the circumstances, “there [were] objective and particularized 
facts giving rise to reasonable suspicion that [Robinson] was armed and 
dangerous.”97  The district court found that because the officers located “the 
vehicle in the same high-crime area as the 7-Eleven mere minutes removed 
from the tip,” and because the officers believed that Robinson “looked weird 
when asked if he was armed” rather than verbally responding, a “reasonably 
prudent officer . . . [would] believe that the officer’s safety or that of others 
was in danger.”98 
In his response to the government’s objection to the R & R, Robinson 
argued that “some sort of facial expression” and a tip indicating that he 
merely possessed a loaded gun failed to supply any evidence of actual 
knowledge that Robinson’s actions constituted a crime and thus were 
insufficient grounds for conviction.99  But while he was able to convince the 
magistrate judge, he could not convince the district court.100  Robinson’s 
motion to suppress was denied.101 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See id. 
 94. No. 3:14-CR-28, 2014 WL 4064035 (N.D.W. Va. Aug. 14, 2014), rev’d, 814 F.3d 201 
(4th Cir. 2016). 
 95. Id. at *4. 
 96. Id. at *1. 
 97. Id. at *4. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Response to United States’ Objections to Report and Recommendation That the 
Motion to Suppress Be Granted at 2, 5–6, Robinson II, No. 3:14-CR-28, 2014 WL 4064035 
(Aug. 14, 2014). 
 100. See Robinson II, 2014 WL 4064035, at *1. 
 101. See id. at *4. 
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3.  Robinson III 
Robinson appealed the district court’s findings, and the case made its way 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.  In United States 
v. Robinson102 (Robinson III ), Circuit Judge Pamela Harris reversed the 
district court and granted the motion to suppress.103 
The Fourth Circuit first held that “in states like West Virginia, which 
broadly allow public possession of firearms, reasonable suspicion that a 
person . . . is armed does not by itself give rise to reasonable suspicion that 
the person is dangerous for Terry purposes.”104  West Virginia permits its 
citizens to carry firearms; thus, possession alone is insufficient to deem 
someone “dangerous.”105 
Second, Robinson’s failure to immediately respond to the police officer’s 
questions did not provide an objective indication of dangerousness, 
especially since “West Virginia does not appear to require that people 
carrying firearms inform the police of their guns during traffic or other 
stops.”106  The officers unreasonably attributed dangerousness to a “weird 
look.”107 
And third, while Robinson was seen loading a firearm and was 
subsequently stopped in a high-crime area, the Fourth Circuit found that the 
totality of the circumstances failed to provide an objective indication that 
Robinson was dangerous.108  The fact that the events took place in a high-
crime area, while occasionally relevant, “does not lend support to an 
inference that Robinson was a danger to the police.”109  To support this 
notion, Judge Harris explained, “[w]here public gun possession is legal, high-
crime areas are precisely the setting in which we should most expect to see 
law-abiding citizens who present no threat to officers carrying guns; there is 
more, not less, reason to arm oneself lawfully for self-defense in a high-crime 
area.”110 
The Fourth Circuit concluded that Terry did not authorize the police officer 
to frisk Robinson and so the firearm, which was found to have been possessed 
illegally, was the inadmissible fruit of a Fourth Amendment violation.111 
 
 102. 814 F.3d 201 (4th Cir. 2016), rev’d on reh’g, 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 103. Id. at 213. 
 104. Id. at 216. 
 105. Id. at 204. 
 106. Id. at 211. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 212–13. 
 109. Id. at 212 (“Whether or not a high-crime environment might make other ambiguous 
conduct—for instance, fleeing from a police officer—more likely to be criminal or dangerous, 
we conclude that it sheds no light on the likelihood that an individual’s gun possession poses 
a danger to the police.” (citation omitted)). 
 110. Id.  “[O]nce a state legalizes the public possession of firearms, unchecked police 
discretion to single out anyone carrying a gun gives rise to ‘the potential for intentional or 
unintentional discrimination based on neighborhood, class, race, or ethnicity.’” Id. at 209 
(emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Williams, 731 F.3d 678, 694 (7th Cir. 2013)). 
 111. Id. at 213. 
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In dissent, Circuit Judge Paul Niemeyer disagreed with the circuit court’s 
holding for three main reasons:  (1) he interpreted Terry’s “armed and thus 
dangerous” language to require that an officer need only reasonably believe 
that Robinson possesses a firearm to conduct a legal frisk;112 (2) the fact that 
Robinson might be legally carrying his firearm did not diminish the potential 
dangerousness of the situation;113 and (3) the reasonable suspicion standard 
“need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct”114—just because 
someone might turn out to be innocent does not automatically mean an 
officer is unreasonable and prohibited from conducting a search.115 
4.  Robinson IV 
The case was then reheard en banc in United States v. Robinson (Robinson 
IV ), and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling in Robinson II 
that there was reasonable suspicion of dangerousness, and therefore, the 
officer’s frisk of Robinson was justified and complied with Terry’s 
requirements.116  Writing for the majority, Judge Niemeyer reasoned “that 
traffic stops alone are inherently dangerous for police officers” and that 
“traffic stops of persons who are armed, whether legally or illegally, pose yet 
a greater safety risk to police officers.”117  It concluded that because the 
officers lawfully stopped Robinson for failing to wear a seatbelt and there 
was reasonable suspicion to believe he was “armed” (from the anonymous 
tip, which was deemed credible), the officers justifiably frisked him—
thereby adopting the notion that “armed” inherently means “dangerous.”118  
The Fourth Circuit gave greater credence to possible police officer danger 
than to the potential legitimacy of Robinson’s gun possession under West 
Virginia law.119  Robinson’s petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was 
denied.120 
Through its procedural history, this case has shown judges arguing among 
themselves regarding what characteristics of a Terry frisk situation are most 
important in assessing an officer’s conduct.  The importance of West 
Virginia’s gun laws, the high-crime area in which the events took place, a 
“weird look,” and police officer safety were all considered and given 
differing weights in the analysis, leading judges to reach different 
conclusions.  This case epitomizes Terry’s disputed framework and 
illustrates how conflicting holdings among circuit and state courts have come 
to be.121 
 
 112. Id. (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). 
 113. Id. at 213–14 (“The frisk authorized by Terry is justified by dangerousness, not by 
criminal conduct.”). 
 114. Id. at 214 (quoting Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 403 (2014)). 
 115. See id. 
 116. See id. at 701 (holding that the officer was justified in frisking Robinson). 
 117. Id. at 698. 
 118. See id. at 701; see also infra Part II.B.1. 
 119. See Robinson IV, 846 F.3d at 698, 701. 
 120. Robinson v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 379 (Oct. 30, 2017) (No. 16-1532) (mem.).  
 121. See infra Part II.B. 
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B.  Does “Armed” Mean “Dangerous”? 
The difficulty courts have had in interpreting “armed and dangerous” 
likely stems from Terry’s precise language.122  While the standard on its face 
implies two separate requirements—“armed and dangerous”—certain 
phrases within the opinion appear to make reasonable the presumption that 
“armed” might inherently mean “dangerous.”123  The interpretation of 
“armed and dangerous” has thus led to a split among courts. 
In addition to the Fourth Circuit in Robinson IV, the Ninth124 and Tenth125 
Circuits also consider a firearm to be inherently dangerous and sufficient to 
satisfy the second Terry prong.  Part II.B.1 considers these circuits’ views 
and relevant holdings. 
On the other hand, the Sixth126 and Seventh127 Circuits, as well as the 
supreme courts of Arizona,128 Idaho,129 and New Mexico,130 have stated that 
possession of a firearm, on its own, is insufficient to conclude that an 
individual is dangerous (analogous to the holdings of Robinson I and III ).  
According to these courts, a Terry frisk violates the Fourth Amendment when 
there is nothing more than a reasonable suspicion that one possesses a 
firearm.131  Part II.B.2 discusses these courts’ views and relevant holdings. 
1.  “Armed” Equals “Dangerous” Under Terry 
In Robinson IV, the Fourth Circuit asserted that possession of a firearm 
inherently makes one dangerous under Terry.132  Regardless of whether the 
police officers in Robinson IV actually had reasonable suspicion to believe 
Robinson was armed, there was little discussion regarding whether Robinson 
was also dangerous—the court simply concluded that because Robinson was 
armed, the situation posed a risk to the officers’ safety, and so, Robinson was 
dangerous.133  In support of its determination, the court relied on both Terry 
and Pennsylvania v. Mimms,134 stating: 
 
 122. See supra Part II.A. 
 123. For example, the phrase “armed and dangerous” is predominantly used, but Chief 
Justice Earl Warren also mixes in “armed and presently dangerous,” which could imply that 
the petitioner was dangerous because he was armed. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24, 30 (1968) 
(emphasis added).  Additionally, the fact that the Court believed that the petitioner was “armed 
and thus presented a threat to the officer’s safety” furthers the notion that one must be 
dangerous because one is armed. Id. at 28 (emphasis added). 
 124. United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 125. United States v. Rodriguez, 739 F.3d 481, 491 (10th Cir. 2013). 
 126. Northrup v. City of Toledo Police Dep’t, 785 F.3d 1128, 1132–33 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 127. United States v. Leo, 792 F.3d 742, 748 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 128. State v. Serna, 331 P.3d 405, 411–12 (Ariz. 2014). 
 129. State v. Bishop, 203 P.3d 1203, 1218 (Idaho 2009). 
 130. State v. Vandenberg, 81 P.3d 19, 25 (N.M. 2003). 
 131. See, e.g., Leo, 792 F.3d at 748; Northrup, 785 F.3d at 1131; Serna, 331 P.3d at 412; 
Bishop, 203 P.3d at 1215; Vandenberg, 81 P.3d at 26. 
 132. See Robinson IV, 846 F.3d 694, 698, 701 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 
(Oct. 30, 2017) (No. 16-1532) (mem.). 
 133. Id. at 698. 
 134. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).  In Mimms, a driver was rightfully pulled over for driving with 
an expired license plate. Id. at 107.  An officer approached the car and asked the driver to step 
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In both Terry and Mimms, the Court deliberately linked “armed” and 
“dangerous,” recognizing that the frisks in those cases were lawful because 
the stops were valid and the officer reasonably believed that the person 
stopped “was armed and thus” dangerous.  The use of “and thus” 
recognizes that the risk of danger is created simply because the person, who 
was forcibly stopped, is armed.135 
The court effectively took a shortcut when determining Robinson’s 
“dangerousness” by reading into Terry’s and Mimms’s precise language.  The 
court analyzed an apparent link between “armed” and “dangerous” to 
conclude that “armed” equals “dangerous” in this case and in every case.136 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Orman,137 claimed that 
“reasonable suspicion that [the defendant] was carrying a gun . . . is all that 
is required for a protective search under Terry.”138  Consequently, the court 
believed that an officer, who was informed that the defendant had carried a 
handgun into a mall and who subsequently retrieved the gun from the 
defendant’s waistband, did not violate the Fourth Amendment because he 
had reason to suspect that the defendant was armed, thereby rendering the 
defendant dangerous for Terry purposes.139 
Although the defendant thought he was complying with state law140 and 
was described by the officers as “calm,” “cooperative,” and “cordial,” the 
court still found that there was reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal 
activity was afoot and that the defendant was armed and (therefore) 
dangerous.141 
In the Tenth Circuit, the court in United States v. Rodriguez142 held that if 
an officer sees an individual carrying a concealed handgun, he can conduct a 
 
out of the vehicle and produce his owner’s card and operator’s license. Id.  Upon exiting the 
vehicle, the officer noticed a large bulge in the driver’s jacket, frisked the driver, and removed 
a firearm from his pocket. Id.  The driver was arrested for illegally carrying a concealed 
firearm and unlawfully carrying a firearm without a license. Id.  In holding that the firearm 
was not the fruit of an unlawful search, the Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he bulge in the 
jacket permitted the officer to conclude that [the driver] was armed, and thus posed a serious 
and present danger to the safety of the officer.” Id. at 112. 
 135. Robinson IV, 846 F.3d at 700 (citations omitted). 
 136. The need to rely on Terry’s precise wording underscores the difficulty in interpreting 
Terry’s true standard.  While Chief Justice Warren predominantly uses “armed and dangerous” 
as the standard, there are enough instances in which he and other courts have diverged from 
that language that calls into question the intended meaning of the “armed and dangerous” 
standard. 
 137. 486 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 138. Id. at 1176. 
 139. See generally id. 
 140. While it is not illegal to carry a gun in Arizona, the specific shopping mall in which 
these events took place prohibits guns, and the defendant at the time was considered a 
“prohibited possessor” due to previous crimes he committed. Id. 
 141. See id. at 1172–73, 1176.  While Robinson’s “weird look” arguably gave the 
impression of dangerousness, the defendant in Orman was characterized in such a way that 
seemingly would not give an impression of dangerousness. See id. at 1176.  Yet, he was found 
to be “dangerous” solely because he was armed. See id. at 1176–77.  This highlights this side 
of the split’s position—the only relevant factor in determining if someone is “dangerous” is 
whether the responding officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that a firearm is present. 
 142. 739 F.3d 481 (10th Cir. 2013). 
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frisk, despite the state’s gun possession laws.143  In Rodriguez, the officer 
was notified via dispatch that two men in a convenience store were showing 
each other their handguns.144  Upon arriving at the scene, the officer directed 
them to step outside, and when the defendant pushed the door open, his shirt 
came up, exposing his waist, and the officer saw the gun and removed it from 
the defendant’s waistband.145  Once outside, the officer directed the 
defendant to turn around and place his hands in a frisk position on a nearby 
truck, and he proceeded to pat the defendant down, presumably to determine 
whether the defendant possessed any other firearms.146  Because the officer 
saw the firearm in the defendant’s waistband as they exited the store, the 
officer knew that the defendant was “armed.”147  Therefore, the officer 
believed that the defendant posed a threat and that he could consequently 
remove the firearm.148 
In its holding, the Tenth Circuit essentially adopted the broad proposition 
that an officer’s knowledge of one’s possession of a firearm is sufficient for 
an officer to conduct a legal frisk,149 regardless of the state’s gun laws.150 
Officer safety is the driving force behind these courts’ holdings.  They rely 
on Terry’s observation that an officer may conduct a frisk when “nothing in 
the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel [the officer’s] reasonable 
fear for his own or others’ safety.”151  Because firearms can be used to assault 
officers, officers should be permitted to conduct frisks regardless of the 
legality of possessing and carrying a firearm in that particular state.152  
 
 143. Id. at 490–91. 
 144. Id. at 483. 
 145. Id. at 483–84.  The defendant alleged that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated 
when the officer removed the gun from his waistband. Id. at 484. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 490–91. 
 149. See id. 
 150. “[T]he frisk for weapons might be equally necessary and reasonable, whether or not 
carrying a concealed weapon violated any applicable state law.” Id. at 491 (quoting Adams v. 
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972)).  In New Mexico, carrying a concealed handgun is legal with 
a license. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-7-2 (2019) (“Unlawful carrying of a deadly weapon consists 
of carrying a concealed loaded firearm . . . anywhere, except . . . by a person in possession of 
a valid concealed handgun license issued to him by the department of public safety pursuant 
to the provisions of the Concealed Handgun Carry Act.”).  However, “the New Mexico Court 
of Appeals [has] held that once a suspect acknowledged he was carrying a concealed loaded 
handgun, officers had probable cause to believe he was ‘committing the crime of unlawfully 
carrying a deadly weapon’ in violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30–7–2, ‘and could arrest him.’” 
Rodriguez, 739 F.3d at 487 (quoting State v. Madsen, 5 P.3d 573, 578 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000)).  
Accordingly, since the officer directly observed the defendant concealing a handgun, he was 
permitted to assume it was illegally concealed and could therefore search and seize the 
defendant. See id. at 488. 
 151. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). 
 152. See, e.g., Robinson IV, 846 F.3d 694, 701 (4th Cir. 2017) (“The presumptive 
lawfulness of an individual’s gun possession in a particular State does next to nothing to negate 
the reasonable concern an officer has for his own safety when forcing an encounter with an 
individual who is armed with a gun . . . .”), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 (Oct. 30, 2017) (No. 
16-1532) (mem.); Rodriguez, 739 F.3d at 491 (“We will not deny an officer making a lawful 
investigatory stop the ability to protect himself from an armed suspect whose propensities are 
unknown.”); United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] 
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Officers may even assume that a suspected gun carrier is illegally carrying 
the firearm.153  Because guns can inflict serious harm, the need for officers 
to promote public safety and complete their duties with limited fear 
outweighs permissive state gun laws and a gun carrier’s right to carry.154  The 
“armed and dangerous” standard can therefore be altered to simply read 
“armed”—an officer can conduct a search when the officer suspects that the 
person with whom the officer is dealing is armed. 
While this side of the split weighs officer safety most heavily, the other 
side of the split, while acknowledging the importance of officer safety, gives 
more credence to whether or not the frisked individual was potentially 
abiding by, or breaking, the particular state’s gun laws when carrying the 
firearm.155 
2.  “Armed” Does Not Equal “Dangerous” Under Terry 
On the other side of the split stand the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, as well 
as the supreme courts of Arizona, Idaho, and New Mexico, which have held 
that the “armed and dangerous” standard requires more than simply 
possessing a firearm or suspicion that a firearm is present.156 
Judge Jeffrey Sutton, writing for the Sixth Circuit in Northrup v. City of 
Toledo Police Department,157 explained that merely being armed does not 
make a person “armed and dangerous” in a state that permits public carrying 
of firearms.158  In defending his position, Judge Sutton explained: 
While open-carry laws may put police officers . . . in awkward situations 
from time to time, the Ohio legislature has decided its citizens may be 
entrusted with firearms on public streets . . . .  The Toledo Police 
Department has no authority to disregard this decision—not to mention the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment—by detaining every “gunman” who 
lawfully possesses a firearm.159 
Here, the court suggests that the reason the plaintiff cannot be deemed 
“armed and dangerous” based solely on his possession of a firearm in public 
is because such possession is entirely legal.160 
 
reasonably prudent man in [the officer’s] circumstances would be warranted in retrieving the 
gun for his safety and the safety of the mall patrons . . . .  [The officer] needed to see that the 
gun was removed from the premises without endangering his safety or the safety of the mall 
patrons.”). 
 153. See Rodriguez, 739 F.3d at 487. 
 154. See, e.g., Robinson IV, 846 F.3d at 701. 
 155. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 156. See supra notes 126–32. 
 157. 785 F.3d 1128 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 158. See id. at 1132 (“[E]stablished law required [the police officer] to point to evidence 
that [the plaintiff] may have been ‘armed and dangerous.’  Yet all [the officer] ever saw was 
that [the plaintiff] was armed—and legally so.” (citation omitted) (quoting Sibron v. New 
York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968))). 
 159. Id. at 1133. 
 160. Id. 
2019] “ARMED AND DANGEROUS” AFTER TERRY 1051 
The Seventh Circuit in United States v. Leo161 explained that, given the 
right to carry a gun in public, courts must resist the suggestion that the 
possible presence of a weapon inevitably poses a threat justifying a search.162  
Further, the court in United States v. Williams163 was faced with similar facts 
to those presented in Robinson but held differently; whereas in Robinson the 
court found an anonymous tip in a high-crime area in conjunction with the 
defendant’s “weird look” to raise reasonable suspicion that the defendant was 
armed and dangerous (thereby justifying a frisk),164 here, a 911 call reporting 
weapons in a high-crime area and the defendant’s avoidance of eye contact 
with the police officer did not justify a frisk.165  In reaching its decision, the 
Seventh Circuit explained, “[m]ost people, when confronted by a police 
officer, are likely to act nervous [and] avoid eye contact . . . thus making such 
behaviors of very little import to a reasonable suspicion determination”166 
and acknowledged that while a high-crime area might be a factor under Terry, 
it is an insignificant one in this case.167 
In State v. Serna,168 the Arizona Supreme Court emphasized that the 
second Terry prong “involves a dual inquiry; it requires that a suspect be 
‘armed and presently dangerous.’”169  However, in Serna, the defendant was 
only “armed,” and possession of a firearm, on its own, is insufficient to label 
an individual “dangerous.”170 
In this case, two police officers were patrolling a “gang neighborhood” 
when they observed the defendant and a woman in the middle of the street.171  
One of the officers called the defendant over, and he obeyed, acting 
“cooperative[ly] and polite[ly].”172  After observing a bulge on the 
defendant’s waist, the officer asked if he had any firearms, to which the 
defendant replied that he had a gun.173  Subsequently, the officer ordered the 
defendant to raise his hands above his head, and the officer removed the gun 
from the defendant’s waistband.174  The officers then discovered that the 
defendant was a convicted felon and “arrested him as a prohibited possessor 
 
 161. 792 F.3d 742, 748 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 162. Id. at 752. 
 163. 731 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 164. See generally Robinson IV, 846 F.3d 694 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 379 
(Oct. 30, 2017) (No. 16-1532) (mem.). 
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1052 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88 
of a firearm.”175  The defendant “moved to suppress the gun as the fruit of a 
search that violated his Fourth Amendment rights.”176 
Agreeing with the defendant, the court explained that “[i]n a state such as 
Arizona that freely permits citizens to carry weapons . . . the mere presence 
of a gun cannot provide reasonable and articulable suspicion that the gun 
carrier is presently dangerous.”177  In fact, “[t]o conclude otherwise would 
potentially subject countless law-abiding persons to patdowns solely for 
exercising their right to carry a firearm.”178 
Like the Sixth Circuit in Northrup, the Arizona Supreme Court 
acknowledged and sympathized with the need for police officers to protect 
themselves; however, in light of the legislature’s gun laws, the constitutional 
and state rights guaranteed to all citizens must not be infringed.179 
Similarly, in State v. Bishop,180 the Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged 
that “weapon possession, in and of itself, does not necessarily mean that a 
person poses a risk of danger.”181  Here, the police officer thought that the 
defendant’s “physical body language, [and] everything about [the situation] 
made [him] feel that [Bishop] could possibly have a weapon on him.”182  But 
the court found that the defendant was not dangerous, as “he did not act 
threatening, did not have a reputation for violence, did not make any furtive 
movements, and was cooperative and polite.”183  Therefore, the court held 
the officer’s search unconstitutional and warned that, in a state that permits 
its citizens to carry firearms, holding an individual in possession to be 
“dangerous” for Terry purposes would justify a police officer frisking anyone 
he thinks might have a gun.184 
Finally, in State v. Vandenberg,185 the New Mexico Supreme Court noted, 
“[t]o justify a frisk for weapons, an officer must have a sufficient degree of 
articulable suspicion that the person being frisked is both armed and 
presently dangerous.”186  Indeed, the court explained that “[a]ny indication 
in previous cases that an officer need only suspect that a party is either armed 
or dangerous is expressly disavowed.”187  While this case upholds the 
defendant’s conviction for illegally possessing marijuana after the police 
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 177. Id. at 410. 
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2019] “ARMED AND DANGEROUS” AFTER TERRY 1053 
officer’s legal frisk, it made clear its understanding that, on its own, suspicion 
of a gun is not sufficient to deem someone “dangerous” under Terry.188 
The primary argument underlying this understanding of Terry is that a 
state’s decision to permit its citizens to carry firearms in public should 
prevent an officer from conducting a frisk merely out of fear that anyone 
carrying a gun could pose a threat to the officer and those in the immediate 
vicinity.189  That is not to say that these courts disregard the importance of 
public safety.  They acknowledge it and give it due weight in the analysis but 
appear to dislike the notion that a law-abiding citizen can be inherently 
dangerous for doing what the state has given him the freedom to do—that is, 
carry a firearm in public.190  The courts defer to the legislature’s decision to 
permit the state’s citizens to carry firearms and avoid weakening the 
significance of that decision by holding in a way that materially reduces the 
freedom that the decision was intended to afford.191 
The “armed and dangerous” standard can therefore be altered to simply 
read “dangerous”—an officer can conduct a search when the officer 
reasonably believes that the person with whom the officer is dealing is 
dangerous.  And possessing a firearm, on its own, does not make a person 
dangerous for Terry purposes. 
III.  MERELY BEING “ARMED” SHOULD NOT MAKE ONE INHERENTLY 
“DANGEROUS” IN PUBLIC CARRY STATES 
Federal circuit and state supreme courts have inconsistently determined 
whether armed individuals in states with lenient “public carry” laws are 
inherently dangerous based solely on the fact that they are armed.192  
Consequently, individuals exercising their Second Amendment and state-
given rights, via Heller and McDonald, are at risk of having their Fourth 
Amendment rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 
restricted.  Therefore, Terry’s “armed and dangerous” standard should not be 
interpreted as “armed and therefore dangerous” in states that permit citizens 
to carry firearms, whether concealed or openly, in public.  While Terry 
controls Fourth Amendment investigatory stop inquiries, its standard needs 
to be interpreted and applied in light of evolving understandings of the 
Second Amendment and state gun laws, which have drastically changed 
since the 1968 Terry opinion. 
Part III.A argues that Terry’s standard must be reevaluated in light of 
Second Amendment and state gun law developments that have occurred over 
the last fifty years.  Part III.B explains how “armed and therefore dangerous” 
might require gun carriers to sacrifice one constitutional right to exercise 
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 189. See United States v. Leo, 792 F.3d 742, 752 (7th Cir. 2015); Bishop, 203 P.3d at 1218–
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another and argues that the potential for a legal gun carrier to pose a threat is 
not significantly more important than maintaining the integrity of 
constitutional rights. 
A.  1968 to Today:  Expanding Gun Rights 
As this Note highlights, Terry, decided in 1968, has led to inconsistent 
results around the country regarding the inherent dangerousness of an 
individual possessing a firearm in a state legally permitting its citizens to 
possess one.193  But over fifty years has passed since Terry, and the legal 
landscape of the Second Amendment and gun ownership rights has 
changed.194  Heller, decided in 2008, gave Americans the individual right to 
possess firearms in the home for self-defense, and two years later, McDonald 
extended the Second Amendment rights recognized by Heller to the states.195 
In 1968, it was illegal for anyone other than a police officer to carry a 
concealed firearm in Ohio.196  Under these circumstances, as soon as the 
officer had reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant was armed, he 
technically also had reason to believe that his life or that of others was in 
danger.197  But today, Ohio is a “shall issue” state, which means that the state 
must issue a concealed carry license to anyone who applies for a license, 
meets certain criteria, and passes certain courses.198  Therefore, while the 
presumption that holds anyone possessing a firearm to be inherently 
dangerous made sense under the 1968 law, it does not make sense today—
reasonable suspicion that an individual is “armed” does not mean that he 
illegally possesses the firearm or is otherwise breaking the law.199  Presently, 
people have more expansive gun possession rights than in the past,200 and 
these rights should play a larger role in Terry analyses. 
Northrup exemplifies how today’s gun laws should be considered in 
comparison to a Terry analysis occurring in 1968.  The case, like Terry, took 
place in Ohio, and the Sixth Circuit focused on the legality of firearm 
possession in the state to adopt a baseline assumption that one’s possession 
of a firearm is not illegal until an officer proves that it is.201  In requiring 
 
 193. See supra Part II. 
 194. See supra Part I.A. 
 195. See generally McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
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officers to highlight environmental factors other than firearm possession in 
search analyses, the court explained that Ohioans have placed their trust in 
“their State’s approach to gun licensure and gun possession,” and therefore, 
the state’s lenient stance on gun possession signifies that an individual cannot 
be “dangerous” for Terry purposes solely because an individual is 
“armed.”202 
Comparing these two Ohio cases is critical, as it demonstrates the 
differences in judicial analysis based on the relevant status of gun laws at the 
time.  Between 1968 and 2015, Ohio’s stance on gun laws changed.203  
Interestingly, but not surprisingly, the two courts’ holdings aligned with the 
state’s gun laws at the time.  But the Fourth Circuit in Robinson, on the other 
hand, held in an unexpected way.  West Virginia, like Ohio, is a “shall issue” 
state and allows open carry;204 yet, the Fourth Circuit still essentially held 
that “armed” equals “dangerous.”205  Therefore, not only is Terry’s standard 
inconsistently interpreted nationwide (as evidenced by the circuit split) but it 
is also unpredictably interpreted—courts’ interpretations of Terry do not 
always align with the particular state’s gun laws.206  To complicate matters 
further, in some states, state courts hold one way while federal courts hold 
another.207  It is therefore clear that something needs to be done to remedy 
the confusion. 
Terry’s framework might not be insufficient, but its interpretation cannot 
be arbitrary—especially in the modern era wherein gun possession is a right 
freely exercised and permitted in many states.  Because the U.S. Supreme 
Court has granted Americans the right to possess firearms,208 and further 
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incorporated that right against the states,209 which are each comprised of 
elected officials supposedly representative of each state’s interests, it follows 
that states are in the best position to either interpret Terry and apply its 
standard or weigh in as to the inherent dangerousness of gun possessors.  
Courts, therefore, should consult the state’s gun laws when determining the 
inherent dangerousness of a gun possessor in that particular state. 
Moreover, “[s]tates [have] great latitude under their police powers to 
legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of 
all persons.”210  Consequently, considering that many states did legislate to 
allow for the public carrying of firearms,211 neither the federal government 
nor the judiciary should categorically deem every gun carrier “dangerous.”  
States have entrusted their citizens to carry guns safely,212 and, as such, the 
inherent dangerousness of a gun carrier should reflect those states’ decisions.  
While allowing people to publicly carry firearms cannot change Fourth 
Amendment law, “it does change the facts on the ground to which Fourth 
Amendment standards apply.”213  And given that circumstances have 
changed to the point that publicly carrying firearms is not illegal or unusual, 
“courts must take into account that changed circumstance in applying the 
familiar Terry standard.”214 
Therefore, Terry’s disputed, unclear language regarding the inherent 
dangerousness of a gun carrier should be interpreted to reflect the states’ 
views towards gun possession.  In states that broadly permit their citizens to 
carry firearms, like West Virginia, “armed” should be distinct from 
“dangerous,” especially when the police confrontation stems primarily from 
a routine traffic violation, like in Robinson.  Thus, given the evolution of gun 
rights and the current arbitrariness in courts’ views towards a gun carrier,215 
the leniency or strictness of a state’s public carry gun laws should dictate a 
court’s decision on the issue. 
B.  The Threat a Gun Carrier Could Potentially Pose Is Not a Significantly 
Greater Public Policy Consideration Than Maintaining Constitutional 
Rights 
If gun carriers are deemed inherently dangerous, then the Fourth 
Amendment does little to protect them against searches and seizures.  As of 
now, it is apparently not unreasonable for an officer to search a law-abiding, 
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gun-carrying individual without further inquiry in some states.216  The Fourth 
Amendment, therefore, is not guaranteed to gun carriers—it is a protection 
that they may need to sacrifice if they want to exercise their Second 
Amendment and state-given rights to publicly carry firearms.217  On the other 
hand, to preserve Fourth Amendment protections, they may need to sacrifice 
their rights to carry firearms.  Americans should not have to opt out of one 
right to opt into another—the two rights should be exercisable 
concurrently.218  But that does not appear to occur with the “armed and 
therefore dangerous” understanding of Terry.219  Relying on a state’s gun 
laws to determine the inherent dangerousness of a gun carrier would help 
resolve this issue. 
Promoting police protection and public safety are important public policy 
considerations.220  Guns undoubtedly have the potential to inflict serious 
harm, and so, reducing the already small probability of a legal gun carrier 
using his or her firearm inappropriately221 to zero likely makes police officers 
feel more secure.222  But the potential to inflict serious harm is a central 
reason that firearms are carried in the first place—for self-defense.223 
The undisputed point of a police officer’s authority to conduct a limited 
search of an individual suspected of carrying a firearm is to protect the officer 
and surrounding area from a potentially dangerous situation.224  And the 
inquiry has always been an objective one that takes into account the totality 
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of the circumstances.225  The only aspect that needs to be reconsidered is the 
entitlement to search upon minimal suspicion that the individual possesses a 
firearm.  A gun can be a factor in the objective analysis of whether the 
individual is dangerous enough to warrant a frisk, but a situation or person is 
not inherently dangerous merely because someone possesses a gun where 
possession is not illegal.226  Claiming that “armed” does not automatically 
mean “dangerous” also does not mean that guns are inherently safe, or lack 
the potential to inflict harm.227  It simply means that the totality of the 
circumstances condition should not be met as soon as the officer suspects a 
firearm is present.228 
Holding that an armed individual is not inherently dangerous does not 
minimize the officer’s authority to promote public safety in dangerous 
situations.  Differentiating between “armed” and “dangerous” protects law-
abiding gun carriers from the unnecessary “petty indignity”229 of a search 
solely because the gun carrier is exercising the right to carry a firearm.230  
But this does not eliminate a police officer’s ability to search an individual 
who the officer has reason to believe poses a threat—the threat just needs to 
be beyond mere gun possession,231 which, as a default status, is not illegal.232 
“Armed” means that one is equipped with a weapon.233  But courts have 
interpreted “weapons” to be numerous everyday objects, including a baseball 
bat, a sharpened pencil, a rope, and even a stick.234  Therefore, interpreting 
Terry’s standard as a unitary concept is an “absurdity” that permits an officer 
to frisk any individual “armed” with any everyday object that could 
conceivably be used as a “weapon.”235  It also permits the officer to ignore 
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the true totality of the circumstances—including whether the state legislature 
has acted to enable state citizens to openly carry firearms.236 
While public safety and preserving constitutional rights are both important 
policy considerations, it is difficult to conclude that one is significantly more 
important than the other in this context.  Requiring police officers to point to 
other objective indicators of dangerousness beyond mere gun possession 
might “engender serious safety concerns,”237 but it does not significantly 
reduce their ability to conduct investigatory stops safely.  Nothing prevents 
an officer from deeming a gun carrier “dangerous” if the attendant situation 
suggests as much—an officer cannot just assume that a gun carrier is 
“dangerous” merely for carrying a gun when the state permits its citizens to 
carry firearms.238  On the other hand, holding a gun possessor to be inherently 
dangerous “has the effect of depriving countless law-abiding citizens of what 
would otherwise be their Fourth Amendment and other constitutional 
rights.”239  Consequently, the threat that a gun possessor could conceivably 
pose does not warrant the certain interference with the integrity of his or her 
constitutional rights. 
Because each state has its own gun laws, a blanket statement such as 
“armed and therefore dangerous” clashes with the idea that elected officials 
are, and have always been, representative of the state’s people.240  The state’s 
elected officials implement gun legislation,241 and, as such, having the 
judiciary step in and delegitimize the state legislature’s authority by creating 
dissonance between the state’s laws and police’s investigatory procedures is 
inappropriate unless the state’s laws are unconstitutional.  To fix this, courts 
should strongly consider a state’s gun laws when confronted with Terry 
situations in the future and require more than mere possession of a firearm to 
conduct a frisk in states that permit their citizens to carry firearms in public. 
CONCLUSION 
Terry’s “armed and dangerous” standard, which permits police officers to 
conduct searches of individuals perceived to pose a threat to the officers’ or 
general public’s safety, has led circuit and state supreme courts to resolve 
similar cases differently.  The dispute among the courts as to whether an 
“armed” individual is inherently “dangerous” solely for carrying a firearm 
implicates the Fourth and Second Amendments, as well as state gun laws.  
The Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures is integral to Americans’ privacy interests and to their protection 
from overzealous governmental intrusion into personal matters.  The Second 
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Amendment, as interpreted by Heller, incorporated against the states by 
McDonald, and expanded by state laws to permit individuals to openly carry 
firearms in public, provides Americans with the means to defend themselves 
against outside threats. 
Given the role that these rights have played throughout American history, 
and continue to play today, infringing upon either must not be tolerated 
unless there is a significantly greater opposing interest at stake.  The need to 
protect officers and the general public from gun carriers who might legally 
possess their firearms, while important, is not a significantly greater interest 
that warrants interfering with the integrity of gun carriers’ constitutional and 
state-given rights in states that have passed laws to allow their citizens to 
openly carry firearms in public.  Further, because American gun rights have 
considerably evolved since the 1968 Terry opinion, the standard for a police 
officer to bypass one’s Fourth Amendment rights and conduct a search 
should reflect today’s gun rights in a particular state rather than reflecting the 
more restrictive gun rights in place in 1968.  Therefore, in states with 
permissive gun laws that allow their citizens to carry firearms in public, 
objective factors other than suspicion or knowledge that a firearm is present 
should be required for an officer to conduct a search.  In these states, merely 
being “armed” should not automatically make one “dangerous” and subject 
to a police search. 
